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Evidence. Paolella v. Radiologic Leasing Associates, 769 A.2d 596
(R.I. 2001). The law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply if two mo-
tions for summary judgment do not present the same question in
the identical manner to the motion justice. Also, the parol-evi-
dence rule provides that parol or extrinsic evidence is not admissi-
ble to vary, alter or contradict a written agreement.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff withdrew from a medical partnership with the de-
fendants.' At the same time, the plaintiff was terminated as
shareholder in the medical practice of the partners. The plaintiff
claimed that the termination was for cause under Article 20 of the
partnership agreement (the agreement).2 As a result, the plaintiff
argued that he was entitled to his share of the appraised value of
the partnership pursuant to Article 22 of the agreement. 3 The
plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment argu-
ing that pursuant to Article 19 of the agreement, he was required
to offer for sale his share of the partnership to the remaining part-
ners and they were required to appraise the value of the shares
and to purchase them.4 The motion was denied.5 Seven months
later after additional discovery, the plaintiff filed a second motion
for summary judgment pursuant to Articles 20 and 22 of the agree-
ment.6 Using new evidence, the plaintiff showed that he had been
terminated under the terms of Article 20 and therefore, the defend-
ants were required to appraise the value of the partnership and to
pay him his fair share as required by Article 22 of the agreement. 7
Plaintiff argued that the second motion differed from the first in
that the first motion was using Article 19, which dealt with the
voluntary sale of his shares to the partners, and the second motion
was based on Articles 20 and 22 which dealt with the required
purchase of his shares following his termination.8 The same mo-
tion justice who had denied the first motion granted the second
1. Paolella v. Radiologic Leasing Associates, 769 A.2d 596, 598 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. id.
8. Id.
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motion for summary judgment.9 Additionally, the trial court
barred the introduction of parol evidence offered by the defendants
to show that there was an oral understanding among the partners
that shares of the partnership's appraised value would not be re-
ceived by a terminated partner.10 By granting summary judg-
ment, the trial court provided for judgment on the issue of liability,
and defendants appealed."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendants argued that the law-of-the-case doc-
trine prevented the motion justice from granting the plaintiffs sec-
ond motion for summary judgment. 12 They asserted that the
second motion was essentially the same as the first and that the
motion justice was bound by the ruling of the first motion.' 3 They
also argued that the motion justice erred by not allowing affidavits
regarding the partners' oral understanding of the agreement. 14
They argued that the affidavits would aid in the interpretation of
the agreement. 15
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the law-of-the-
case doctrine did not apply because the two motions for summary
judgment did not present the same question in the identical man-
ner to the motion justice. 16 The court pointed out that the second
motion for summary judgment relied upon a different provision of
the agreement and used newly discovered evidence.' 7
The court also ruled that, while evidence can be used to aid in
the interpretive process to assist in determining its meaning,' 8 pa-
rol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict a written
agreement.' 9 The court stated that the evidence offered by the de-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 598-99.
14. Id. at 599.
15. Id.
16. Id. (noting that the law of the case doctrine should also not be used to
perpetuate a clearly erroneous earlier ruling even if it otherwise might apply (cit-
ing In re Estate of Speight, 739 A.2d 229, 231 (R.I. 1999))).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing W.P. Associates v. Forcier, Inc., 637 A.2d 353, 356 (R.I. 1994)).
19. Id. (citing Supreme Woodworking Co. v. Zuckerberg, 107 A.2d 287, 290
(R.I. 1954)).
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fendants did not aid in determining the intent of the parties, but
instead directly contradicted the written agreement. 20 Therefore,
the court ruled that based on the clear language of the agreement
the motion justice correctly ruled in the plaintiffs favor holding the
defendants liable to the plaintiff for the value of his share of the
partnership. 21 The court denied the defendant's appeal and af-
firmed the grant of summary judgment.22
CONCLUSION
The law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply when two sum-
mary judgment motions, brought before the same judge months
apart, presented different questions. The parol-evidence rule
barred the use of the alleged partners' oral understanding that di-
rectly contradicted the plain language of the written agreement.
Joe H. Lawson II
20. Id. at 600.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Evidence. Raimbeault et al. v. Takeuchi Mfg. (U.S.), Ltd. et al.,
772 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 2001). Reaffirming Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the supreme court held that the proposed
expert witness lacked the requisite knowledge and skill, and that
his testimony was irrelevant; thus, the plaintiff failed to establish
a negligent design claim. Also, even though the manufacturer had
a duty to warn of dangers, the plaintiff assumed the risk when he
used the equipment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Ronald Raimbeault (Raimbeault), owned a com-
pany that rented construction equipment. 2 On January 14, 1991,
Raimbeault demonstrated a track-driven Takeuchi compact exca-
vator, Model TB 800, to a customer.3 Raimbeault got into the cab
of the excavator, which could rotate 360 degrees-independent of
the excavator's track-drive system. 4 Raimbeault backed the exca-
vator to the edge of an embankment and rotated the cab several
times.5
When the demonstration had concluded, the cab of the excava-
tor was facing the backhoe looking out over the embankment.
While the cab was in this position, Raimbeault pulled back on the
levers that controlled the movement of the excavator, which caused
the excavator to move towards the embankment.6 The excavator
became unstable, so Raimbeault jumped out of the excavator to the
bottom of the embankment. 7 The excavator then fell down the em-
bankment, landing on Raimbeault's foot.8
Raimbeault, together with his wife and son (collectively "plain-
tiffs"), filed a products liability and negligence action against
Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., et al.9 At trial, Raimbeault
testified as to the events and admitted that he had told an investi-
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Raimbeault v. Takeushi Mfg., 772 A.2d 1056, 1058 (R.I. 2001).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1059.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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gator that "the accident was caused solely by my losing control of
[the excavator] due to the icy conditions." 10
Marc Richman (Richman) testified as the plaintiffs' expert wit-
ness.1 Richman was a retired professor from Brown University,
where he had taught courses dealing with warnings on the opera-
tion of equipment.12 Richman held a doctor of science from MIT,
where he had been an instructor in the metallurgy department.13
Richman testified that he had experience with track-driven ma-
chinery when he was in the army.14 Richman testified that he had
driven the TB 800 in 1998 and stated that the TB 800's warnings
and instructions were inadequate and that the design of the TB
800 was flawed because it did not take into account memory
lapses.15
The trial judge, however, decided to exclude Richman's testi-
mony. Moreover, the trial judge found that Raimbeault's negli-
gence in operating the excavator was the proximate cause of his
injuries. 16 The defendants then moved for a judgment as a matter
of law, which the trial judged granted. 17 The plaintiffs appealed
the final judgment arguing that the trial judge erred both by ex-
cluding Richman's testimony and by granting the defendants'
motion.' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court first tackled the issue of the exclusion of the pro-
posed expert's testimony. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence' 9 and as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., trial justices are
to act as "gatekeepers," ensuring that proposed experts are quali-
fied and that all scientific testimony is both relevant and relia-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1060.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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ble.20 Daubert is applicable in Rhode Island state courts in
conjunction with Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 702.21
The court stated that scientific material may only be admitted
if it is "relevant, appropriate, and of assistance to the jury."22 The
expert testimony must reflect scientific knowledge that is testable
by scientific experimentation and it must materially advance some
aspect of the plaintiffs case. 23 The court "will not disturb a trial
justice's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony absent an
abuse of discretion."24
Here, the court found no such abuse of discretion.25 Regarding
Richman's "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,"
the court stated that he had no experience with track-driven ma-
chinery, no experience designing cabs for track-driven machinery,
and only limited experience with warnings and instructions in gen-
eral.26 The court also stated that Richman had never designed a
warning for a commercially marketed product, nor had he any
training in the area of human factors. 27
Furthermore, the court stated that Richman's testimony was
not "relevant, appropriate, [or] of assistance to the jury."28 Rich-
man failed to elucidate any specific scientific reasons that sup-
ported his finding that the excavator was unreasonably dangerous,
but rather testified in a conclusory manner as to those findings. 29
Thus, the court found that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion.
Regarding the issue of the judgment as a matter of law, the
court stated that it must consider the evidence in the light most
20. Raimbeault, 772 A.2d at 1061.
21. Id. (citing DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677 (R.I. 1999)). R.I.
R. Evid. 702 reads:
Testimony by experts-If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of fact or
opinion.
R.I. R. Evid. 702.
22. Raimbeault, 772 A.2d at 1061 (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 686).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1061 (quoting Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1998)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 686).
29. Id.
48720021
488 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
favorable to the nonmoving party.30 The court may not weigh the
evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses, but the court
must consider all reasonable inferences supporting nonmoving
party.31 If reasonable persons could reach different conclusions
about factual issues then the motion must be denied.32 The court
stated that in reviewing the trial justice's decision, the court must
abide by the same rules and standards as the trial justice.33
In order to succeed in a products liability action the plaintiff
must prove that there was a defect in design or construction; that
the defect existed when left possession of defendant; that the defect
caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous (strong likeli-
hood that one unaware of danger would get injured by normally
using product); that the product was used as intended at time of
accident; and, that the product was the proximate cause of the ac-
cident and injuries.34
Here, the court noted that Raimbeault's testimony seems to
suggest that the excavator was not in the same condition as it was
when it left the defendants' hands; it had been rented and had
scrapes and dents.35 The court stated that the plaintiffs failed to
produce any evidence indicating that the absence of warnings in
the cab was the proximate cause of the accident/injuries. 36 Fur-
thermore, Raimbeault told an investigator that he was responsible
for the accident. 37
Regarding the plaintiffs' negligent design claims, the fact that
Richman's testimony was properly excluded meant that the plain-
tiffs had not put forth any evidence that showed that the defend-
ants had not met there standard of care-that the defendants had
reason to know of a defective design or failed to adequately test the
product. 38
30. Id. (citing DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 262 (R.I. 1996)).
31. Id. (citing DeChristofaro, 685 A.2d at 262).
32. Id. (citing DeChristofaro, 685 A.2d at 262).
33. Id. at 1063 (citing Hoffman v. McLaughlin Corp., 675 A.2d 404, 405 (R.I.
1996)).
34. Id. (citing Crawford v. Cooper/T.Smith Stevedoring Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d
202, 211 (D.R.I. 1998)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 721 (R.I. 1985)).
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The court stated that under strict liability the seller must
warn buyer only of reasonably foreseeable dangers.3 9 Here, the
court found that using the excavator on hills or near embankments
was foreseeable, as was the fact that one might get disoriented in
the rotating cab.40 However, Raimbeault assumed the risk.
Raimbeault testified that he was aware that the levers were ori-
ented towards the dozer blade; that he had given demonstrations
with the excavator previously; and, that he knew he was on the
edge of an embankment. 41 Thus, the trial justice did not err in
granting the motion.
CONCLUSION
The supreme court held that the proposed expert witness
lacked the requisite knowledge and skill, and that his testimony
was irrelevant; thus, the plaintiff failed to establish a negligent de-
sign claim. Also, even though the manufacturer had a duty to
warn of dangers, the plaintiff assumed the risk when he used the
equipment.
Stan Pupecki
39. Id. (citing Thomas, 488 A.2d at 722).
40. Id.
41. Id.
2002]
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Evidence. State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929 (R.I. 2001). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the determination of a defendant's
alleged insanity or diminished capacity is a legal rather than a
medical question that is left to the fact-finder or jury. The jury, in
determining a defendant's responsibility, is to consider volitional
as well as cognitive impairments. The court also held that a lay
witness may not offer an opinion on mental state, but may describe
observed facts and descriptions of events upon which the witness
has proffered his opinion and allow the jury to draw its conclusion
from the recitation of those observations.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On July 14, 1995, David Barrett, the defendant, (Barrett or
defendant) had an altercation at a service station with the clerk,
Michael Glynn, ending with Barrett's threat to kill Glynn.1 On
July 17, Barrett and two friends, decided to drive to the station
where Glynn worked so Barrett could check out Glynn because he
was "pissed off" at him. 2 Barrett and his friends, upon arriving at
the station, parked at a gas pump facing the inside of the station
with his high-beaming lights shinning in at Glynn. 3 Glynn came
outside and apologized to Barrett for the previous altercation and
Barrett told him to get away from his car.4 Barrett and his friends
remained outside.5
Shortly thereafter, Joseph Silvia, while visiting Glynn at the
station, learned of Barrett's behavoir and subsequently drove his
van along side of Barrett's car.6 Silvia threatened to kill Barrett if
he continued to bother Glynn, he and Barrett engaged in a heated
verbal exchange and Barrett drew his gun. 7 Barrett pointed his
gun at Silvia and began to chase him around the station parking
lot telling him at least thirty times to leave or he will shoot him.8
Silvia then drove in front of Barrett's car, put his van in re-
verse, and crashed into the front of Barrett's car.9 Barrett then
1. State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929, 932 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 932-33.
5. Id. at 933.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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walked up to the van and shot Silvia point blank in the cheek
through his open driver's side window. 10 Barrett then fired a sec-
ond shot into Silvia, backed away from the van to see if there were
any witnesses, and returned to the van to shoot Silvia a third
time."
Barrett then went to the front window of the station, emptied
the remaining bullets from his gun, and placed the gun and bullets
on the windowsill. 12 He told one of his friends to go inside the sta-
tion and call the police and Barrett returned to his car.' 3 Barrett
then placed his gun on the dash of his car so it would be in plain
view of the police so they would not shoot him when they arrived. 14
He also removed his outer shirt so the police would not think that
he was carrying a concealed weapon.'1 He then took a bag of mari-
juana from his shirt pocket and told his friend to get rid of it be-
cause he was afraid the police would think that the marijuana use
played a role.16 The police came shortly thereafter and took Bar-
rett to the station, at which point he gave a detailed written state-
ment regarding the shooting.17
At trial, a total of four medical experts testified to Barrett's
mental state; two expert opinions supported the defense's theory
while only one supported the state's position.' In addition to the
medical experts, the defense offered three lay witnesses, Barrett's
father and two friends not involved in the incident, to testify about
their personal opinions regarding Barrett's mental condition.' 9
The trial justice refused to allow their opinion testimony as to Bar-
rett's mental condition. 20 Barrett was convicted of second-degree
murder.21
Barrett appealed his conviction contending that at the time of
the shooting "he was of such diminished mental capacity as to be
incapable of having formed the required intent and premeditation
10. Id.
11. Id. at 933-34.
12. Id. at 934.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 937-38
19. Id. at 938-39.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 934.
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necessary for conviction of murder."22 Barrett also contended that
the trial court erred in barring testimony from his lay witnesses
regarding his mental state. 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Diminished Capacity
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Barrett's claim
that the trial jury erred in not accepting the defense's expert medi-
cal opinions was without merit.24 In State v. Johnson,25 the court
adopted the Model Penal Code standard for determining one's abil-
ity to form the intent required to make one criminally culpable.26
The court found merit in the Model Penal Code test because it rec-
ognizes that the issue of determining a defendant's mental capac-
ity or insanity is an issue that is left to the jury.27 The test also
recognizes that the issue is a legal question and not a medical
question and the jury is permitted "to consider volitional as well as
cognitive impairments in determining a defendant's responsibil-
ity."28 The court noted that "the Model Code permitted 'a reasona-
ble three-way dialogue between the law trained judges and
lawyers, the medical trained experts and the jury.' [And] [iun Bar-
rett's trial in the Superior Court, that three-way dialogue was
played out."2 9
The court held that the trial jury had before it the various ex-
pert opinions presented by each side and the mere fact that two of
the opinions supported Barrett's defense of diminished capacity
and only one expert opinion supported the state's position is not "in
itself dispositive of the issue of Barrett's mental condition at the
time of the shooting."30 The court pointed out that the jurors are
reminded that their evaluation of expert testimony should not de-
pend on the number of experts that testify for one position or the
other, but rather the quality of the testimony concerning that fact
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 938.
25. 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979).
26. Barrett, 768 A.2d at 934-35 (citing Johnson, 399 A.2d. at 476).
27. Id. at 935.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Johnson, 399 A.2d at 476).
30. Id. at 937-38.
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issue.31 The court went on to point out that it was obvious that the
jurors chose to accept the testimony offered by one medical expert
and to reject the testimony offer by two others.32 The court wrote,
"that was the trial jury's choice to make."33
While the court recognized that there was evidence of Bar-
rett's mental illness, that evidence alone did not require the jury to
conclude that Barrett did not have the mental capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.34 The court found
"more than sufficient evidence" in the trial record to support the
jury's finding Barrett was not legally insane at the time he shot
Silvia.35
Lay Witness Opinion
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that there were no
"transgressions on the part of the trial justice in his rulings pre-
cluding the defendant's attempt to elicit expert opinions from lay
witnesses who were clearly not qualified to proffer those opin-
ions."3 6 Barrett contended that the trial justice erred by not al-
lowing his lay witnesses to testify on his behalf regarding their
opinions on the state of Barrett's mental health.37 He claimed that
state courts have traditionally allowed lay witnesses to testify re-
garding their opinion of a person's mental health.38
The court found that the lay opinions of Barrett's father and
two friends who were not present at the time of the incident would
not be rationally based upon their opinions of Barrett on the day of
the shooting since they had not seen him that day.39 Barrett also
asserted that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecutor's
objections to questions posed during cross-examination by his de-
fense counsel seeking to elicit lay opinions from two prosecution
witnesses.40
31. Id. at 938.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 943-44.
37. Id. at 938-39.
38. Id. at 939.
39. Id. at 940.
40. Id.
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Evidence by lay witnesses regarding a defendant's noncon-
forming or bizarre behavior is allowed when it is asserted that the
defendant's alleged diminished capacity prevented the formation of
his intent to commit murder in the first or second degree. 41 How-
ever, the court has interpreted that rule as permitting an opinion
on a matter as it was observed by the witness, but generally, only
when the witness is not able to describe the event or events as they
appeared when the events took place.42 Where the lay witness is
able to describe to the jury the events that took place from which
the lay witness's opinion was formed, the court has "generally pre-
cluded the lay opinion."43
The court concluded that there is less justification to allow tes-
timony from a lay witness regarding another sanity or diminished
capacity at a time when that person was not being observed by the
lay witness.4 The court pointed out that such lay witness opinions
could "invade the fact-finding province of the jury and serve only to
inject confusion into their deliberations."45 The court wrote that
the jury was as capable as the lay witnesses to draw their own
opinions from the witnesses' descriptions of Barrett's behavior. 46
The court ruled that there was no error or abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in precluding defense counsel from elicit-
ing lay opinions from the witnesses. 47
CONCLUSION
In State v. Barrett, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
a jury's decision to reject the two medical opinions in support of the
defense's theory and accept one medical opinion in support of the
state's position is entirely within the jury's power so long as there
is evidence to support that finding. Furthermore, the court found
that a lay witness my not offer an opinion on mental state, but may
describe observed facts and descriptions of events upon which the
41. Id. at 940.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 941.
45. Id. (pointing out that while Federal Rule 704(b) precludes both lay and
expert witness opinion on a defendant's mental condition, Rhode Island Rule 704
does not preclude all such opinions. Their admission is usually left to the discre-
tion of the trial judge).
46. Id.
47. Id.
20021 SURVEY SECTION 495
witness has proffered his opinion and allow the draw its conclusion
from the recitation of those observations.
Joe H. Lawson II
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Evidence. State v. Dorsey, 783 A.2d 947 (R.I. 2001). Evidence to
impeach a complaining witness needs to be probative, relevant and
cannot be remote in time.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction for rape., The
defendant wanted to use three separate facts about the complain-
ant's past to impeach her during cross-exam. 2 These included: the
paternity of the complainant's oldest child, the complainant's claim
that she was raped when she was a teenager and her mental
health history.3 The defendant claimed that the trial court's re-
fusal to allow such information constituted a violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights, or in the alternative an abuse of the courts'
discretion.4
The complainant's first child resulted from a relationship that
happened before she and the defendant started dating.5 The com-
plainant filed three paternity suits.6 She dropped two of these
suits because blood tests have proven that it was impossible for
two of the three men to be the biological father of the child.7 The
third suit was still pending at the time of this criminal trial."
The next fact that the defendant wanted to use occurred while
the complainant was a teenager.9 When the complaining witness
was fifteen years old, she alleged that a fourteen-year-old paperboy
had raped her when she was seven years old. 10 She did not tell the
doctor, whom she told of the incident, the name of the paperboy. 1"
Her mother, upon hearing this, called the complaining witness a
liar.12
The last set of facts that the defendant wanted to impeach the
complaining witness with was her mental health history. 13 The
1. State v. Dorsey, 783 A.2d 947, 949 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 949-50.
10. Id. at 950.
11. Id. at 953.
12. Id. at 950.
13. Id.
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complaining witness was hospitalized for several weeks when she
was fifteen years old due to a suicide attempt. 14 Also, when the
complaining witness was twenty-one years old, she was treated for
depression.15 The defendant was married to the complaining wit-
ness in 1994; they separated in 1996 and divorced in 1997.16 The
alleged rape occurred after the separation but before the divorce.17
The state filed, and was granted, a motion in limine to exclude
each of these pieces of evidence.' 8 Defendant appealed stating that
the trial court granted each of these motions in error. 19 He argues
that the facts should have been allowed in order to allow the jury
to determine the credibility of the witness. 20
The constitutional issue in the case is whether the exclusion of
the evidence violated the defendant's right to cross-examine the
witness. 21 If this constitutional right was not violated, the next
issue is whether the trial justice abused his discretion by excluding
the evidence. 22
BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.23 The Rhode Island Constitution in Article 1, Section 10,
has the same guarantees.24 These provisions guarantee an indi-
vidual accused of a crime the right to confront and cross-examine
all adverse witnesses.26 This right is not completely unlimited, if
the defendant is allowed to cross-examination the witness to test
his or her credibility, the trial justice has discretion to limit the
cross-examination in light of concerns for relevance, evidentiary
and trial management. 26 The standard used to determine the ap-
propriateness of the exclusion is the clear abuse of discretion stan-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 951.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 950.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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dard.27 If there is clear abuse, the harmless error rule will apply,
meaning that if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the trial justice will not be overturned.28
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The court first looked at the Constitutional issue. It held that
the exclusion of the evidence was not violative of defendant's rights
to cross-examination because the defendant was allowed to cross-
examine the witness with respect to the present charges, as well as
the events leading up to these charges. 29
The court went on to say that evidence of the witness's credi-
bility is also protected by the Constitution.30 The evidence submit-
ted to test the credibility must be related to the current charges
against the defendant. 31 Allegations of similar charges, even if
later proven false, would be related to the current charges. 32 The
court determined the paternity test charges were irrelevant be-
cause the charges were substantially different from the current
rape charges. 33 The allegation of rape by the paperboy was so re-
mote in time, so different in events, and potentially misleading to
the jury, as to be prejudicial to the complaining witness.34 The de-
fendant's constitutional rights could not be infringed by exclusion
of these pieces of evidence.35
The court next looked to determine if the trial justice abused
his discretion by limiting the cross-examination. 36 To determine if
there was abuse, the court first looked at the earlier paternity
suits.3 7 In concluding that these cases were irrelevant the court
determined the similarity of the charges, if there was a history of
intentionally false accusations, and if there were a pattern of
falsely charging sexual assault or rape.38 As the paternity suits
27. Id. at 951.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 952.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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did not contain allegations of non-consensual sexual conduct, they
could be excluded as irrelevant.39 The court held that the defen-
dant had no right to impeach the witness through specific exam-
ples of bad character or bad acts.40
The court next reviewed the allegation that the fourteen-year-
old paperboy raped the witness when she was seven. 41 The court
held that the trial justice did not err in excluding this evidence.42
The factors that led to this conclusion included: the remoteness in
time, the difference in events surrounding the allegations, the dif-
ference in age of the complaining witness (i.e. tender age versus
being an adult), and the possibility of consent as a defense in adult-
hood that would not have been available to the child molestation
charge.43 The law applicable to such a determination is that the
evidence rules are set up to allow victims to come forward without
fear that their entire sexual history would be needlessly exposed to
all in the courtroom. 44 However, if the defense makes an offer of
proof and the evidence is relevant, the trial justice must weigh the
probative value against the prejudicial effect of the testimony.45 If
the probative value outweighs the prejudicial, the evidence should
be admitted; if the prejudicial outweighs the probative, then the
evidence should be excluded.46
Lastly, the court analyzed the specific incidents of the com-
plaining witness's mental health.47 The first incident occurred
when the complaining witness was fifteen, the second occurred
when she was twenty-one. 48 The court held that in order for
mental health to be relevant it must indicate the mental health of
the complaining witness at the time of the alleged rape, or at the
time of the testimony of the witness.49 Since neither of these ap-
plies, the court held that the trial justice did not err in excluding
the evidence. 50
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 953.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 954.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 955.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 955-56.
50. Id. at 956.
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CONCLUSION
In a criminal suit that alleged rape, the defendant has a right
to cross-examine any adverse witnesses. The right extends to the
ability to impeach the complaining witness's testimony. The evi-
dence offered to impeach must be relevant, probative, and based on
similar events or indicative of the mental health of the com-
plaining witness at the time of the alleged crime, or at the time of
the testimony of the complaining witness.
Marjorie A. Connelly
SURVEY SECTION
Evidence. State v. Medina, 767 A.2d 655 (R.I. 2001). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court sustained an appeal by the state, holding
that although both the United States Constitution and the Rhode
Island Constitution affords a criminal defendant the right to con-
front witnesses offered against him, hearsay evidence that falls
within a well recognized exception can be used in lieu of a witness's
actual appearance without violating the defendant's right to con-
frontation. The court also held that the trial justice erred in hold-
ing the complaining witness unavailable merely because she
refused to testify.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 25, 1998, Officer Scott Salois (Officer Salois) re-
sponded to a domestic dispute at 312 Middle Street in Pawtucket
involving Alice Bigelow (Bigelow) and David Medina (Medina or
Defendant).' According to a Domestic Violence/Sexual Assault Re-
porting Form, Medina had had assaulted Bigelow several times
over the previous four to five months. 2 Based on Officer Salois'
statements, Bigelow met him at the door yelling and crying, stat-
ing that after pouring out the defendant's beer, Medina threw the
beer bottle at her, striking her in the back.3 Bigelow further told
the officer that Medina threw her against the wall, causing her to
strike the back of her head against the kitchen wall.4 Bigelow then
told Officer Salois that subsequent to her hitting her head, she
picked up a bat and swung at Medina. 5 As a result of Bigelow's
statements, the defendant was charged with two felony counts;
count one alleging that the defendant assaulted Bigelow after hav-
ing been previously convicted of domestic assault and count two
alleging that the defendant had assaulted Bigelow with a danger-
ous weapon. 6
At the start of the trial, the trial justice conducted a personal
voir dire of Bigelow at which time she informed the judge that she
did not wish to testify and also recanted several of the statements
1. State v. Medina, 767 A.2d 655, 656 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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she had previously made to Officer Salois. 7 Bigelow told the judge
that though the defendant had thrown the beer bottle at her, it did
not hit her as she stated earlier.s She also told the judge that she
assaulted Medina as well, and that she only called 911 to get the
defendant in trouble, not because she feared him.9 After the exam-
ination of Bigelow, the trial justice granted defendant's oral motion
to dismiss.10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the state argues that the trial justice erred in not
ordering Bigelow to testify on pain of contempt for purposes of de-
termining her unavailability." Rule 804 of the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence provides in part that an unavailable witness in-
cludes a witness who persists in refusing to testify despite an order
of the court to do so. 12 The supreme court stated that it is essential
for a trial justice to apply all appropriate judicial pressures and
exhaust the remedies available to compel a witness to testify in
order to avoid the necessity of relying on out-of-court state-
ments.13Accordingly, the supreme court held that the trial justice
should have ordered to witness to testify for purposes of determin-
ing her unavailability. 14
The State also contested the trial justice's dismissal of Bige-
low's statements on the basis that the defendant would not have
the opportunity to confront the witness presented against him.15
The supreme court stated that although the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the
Rhode Island Constitution affords a criminal defendant the right
to confront the witness offered against him, hearsay evidence that
falls within a well recognized exception can replace a witness's ac-
tual appearance without violating the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right.16 The court noted that it had rejected the Sixth
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 657.
13. Id. (citing United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 58 (R.I. 1995)).
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Amendment claim of a defendant in a case factually similar to the
instant case, holding that admissions of the wife's excited utter-
ances pursuant to Rule 803(2) did not violate the defendant's right
of confrontation under either the state or federal constitution. 17 In
the instant case, the court acknowledged that "any decision made
by a trial justice concerning the admission of excited utterances
shall not be overturned unless clearly wrong."18 The court con-
cluded that the trial justice erred in not determining whether Bige-
low's statements to Officer Salois constituted an excited utterance
and whether they were sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be
admitted pursuant to Rule 803.19
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained the state's appeal,
holding that a complaining witness who refuses to testify cannot be
deemed unavailable unless the witness maintains her refusal after
she has been ordered to testify by the trial justice. In addition, the
court held that the trial justice erred in not making a determina-
tion as to whether the statements made by Bigelow to Officer Sal-
ois constituted an excited utterance.
Michelle M. Alves
17. Id. at 658.
18. Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 574 A.2d 149, 151 (R.I. 1990)).
19. See id. at 658-59.
2002] 503
504 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:403
Evidence. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971 (R.I. 2001). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the defendant's constitutional
right to cross-examination was not offended by the admission of
hearsay under Rule 804 since there were indicia of reliability de-
spite the lack of confrontation. The supreme court also affirmed
the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
because the evidence was sufficient to show that the victim suf-
fered torture and aggravated battery.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 18, 1995, the body of Jenny-Lee M. Bailey (Bai-
ley or victim) was found on the shore of Gorton's Pond in War-
wick.1 John R. Pacheco, Jr. (Pacheco or defendant) had hired
Jonathan Tretton (Tretton) to murder the victim.2 The defendant,
Tretton, friend Christopher King (King) and the prosecution's
prime witness, Tretton's girlfriend Tanya Casala kCasala) all re-
sided together in West Warwick.3 Casala testified that on the eve-
ning before the victim's body was found, the defendant had arrived
at the house and asked whether Tretton was ready.4 She also tes-
tified that she watched for several minutes as the defendant sharp-
ened a knife, and that the defendant told her that a window weight
he was holding was "to bonk people over their heads."5 Casala fur-
ther testified that the defendant asked King for the victim's phone
number, which he called twice, once to instruct her to meet him
where he fished, and the other to tell her not to tell anyone about
their meeting.6 In addition, Casala testified that Tretton had told
her that he had been hired to kill someone in return for $1,000, a
car, and employment, but that he "intended only to 'beat the per-
son up.'" 7 She also testified that she heard the defendant state
that he would drop Tretton off at Gorton's Pond while he visited
his girlfriend. Moreover, she testified that the defendant and Tret-
ton returned to their home approximately an hour later, at which
point she noticed that Tretton was now wearing the pink jogging
1. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 974 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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pants that he had been carrying when he left the house, and heard
the defendant ask King whether he had seen the blood on Tretton's
hands.8 She testified that she was very upset by the events and
that after communicating those concerns to the defendant and
Tretton, the defendant told her not to view Tretton as a murderer,
that he was just doing a favor for a friend.9 She also testified re-
garding the conversation she had with Tretton that night detailing
the murder. 10
The defendant filed a motion to be tried separately from Tret-
ton, which was granted." A jury found the defendant guilty of
first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in
allowing Casala to testify about statements made by Tretton; spe-
cifically, that Tretton's statements regarding what the defendant
and Tretton had discussed before the murder and Casala's testi-
mony as to what Tretton said following the murder, were not
against his penal interest and therefore should not have been ad-
mitted under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evi-
dence. 13 In addition, the defendant also challenged Tretton's
statements to Casala after the conspiracy had ended on the basis
that he was denied his right to cross-examination guaranteed by
the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and ar-
ticle 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. 14 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court stated that this issue was not raised at trial
and thus could not be raised on appeal for the first time.' 5 None-
theless, the supreme court did comment on the issue, stating that
Tretton's statements made in Casala's presence were clearly
against his own interest, and that although statements made by
Tretton to Casala before the murder did not clearly inculpate the
defendant when viewed individually, the defendant's own state-
8. Id. at 975.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 974.
13. Id. at 976.
14. Id. at 977.
15. Id. (citing State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I. 1999)).
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ments and actions that evening provided more than sufficient evi-
dence to support his conviction. 16
The defendant also disputed the admission of testimony re-
garding a phone call received by Tretton. 17 Pacheco argued that
Casala's testimony regarding the phone call violated his Sixth
Amendment rights because Tretton had refused to testify at the
defendant's trial.' 8 The supreme court held that the trial justice,
in considering the motion for mistrial, appropriately admitted the
statement, concluding that "the reference to 'Chico' was not suffi-
ciently inflammatory to distract the jury from the overwhelming
evidence that defendant was directing Tretton's actions on that
evening."19
The defendant also contested the trial justice's instructions to
the jury on statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 20
The defendant did not object to these instructions at trial and, ac-
cordingly, cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. 2' How-
ever, the supreme court did comment that if a timely objection had
been made, it would have concluded that the trial justice did ap-
propriately instruct the jury on the law of conspiracy.22
Also on this appeal, the defendant argued that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel precluded the state from seeking a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole once the jury in the
Tretton (defendant's coconspirator's) case had not made a finding
of aggravating circumstances. On this issue, the court held that
the defendant's theory of collateral estoppel could not satisfy the
requirement of identity of the parties, finding that Tretton and the
defendant were distinct and separate parties with interests in op-
position to each other.23 The court also found that the state had
met the required burden of proving to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that aggravating circumstances were present and therefore
the defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial justice
allowing the jury to find aggravating circumstances. 24
16. Id. at 976-77.
17. Id. at 979.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247, 250 (R.I. 1985)).
22. Id. at 980.
23. Id. at 980-81.
24. Id. at 981.
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The defendant also sought a reduction of his life-without-pa-
role sentence pursuant to Rhode Island law "which allows for a di-
rect appeal in cases in which a life sentence without the possibility
of parole has been imposed."25 Although not objected to at trial,
the defendant alleged that the trial justice erred in charging the
jury on the aggravating factor of murder for hire.26 The defendant
also argued that the jury erred in finding that aggravating factors
existed because the record did not reveal any evidence that the
purpose of the conspiracy was to torture or abuse the victim. 27 In
reviewing a sentence imposing life without the possibility of pa-
role, the supreme court must exercise independent judgment and
discretion in reviewing the appropriateness of the sentence. 28 The
court stated that once a jury has found at least one aggravating
circumstance as required by state law, the trial justice may impose
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.29 The supreme
court found that the record disclosed ample evidence of cruelty and
brutality to support the jury's finding of aggravated battery and
torture and a sentence of life without parole. 30
The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Weisberger dissented. 31 He argued that the trial
justice's charge of aggravating circumstances to the jury was erro-
neous because the defendant did not participate in the acts of tor-
ture or aggravated battery because he was not at the scene of the
crime.32
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed the
defendant's appeal, finding no error with the trial justice's admit-
tance of hearsay statements or with his instructions to the jury. In
addition, the court found that because there existed at least one
25. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-5 (2001)).
26, Id. at 982 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (2001)).
27. Id. at 981.
28. Id. (citing State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112, 1119 (R.I. 2000)).
29. Id. (citing State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 323 (R.I. 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-23-2 (2001)).
30. Id. at 982-83.
31. Id. at 984. (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
32. Id.
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aggravating circumstance, the trial justice did not err in imposing
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Michelle M. Alves
SURVEY SECTION
Evidence. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893 (R.I. 2001). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held: (1) exclusion is not an excessive sanc-
tion for evidence that is entirely a surprise; (2) counsel for a co-
defendant is prohibited from commenting on the failure of the ac-
cused to testify since the prejudice to the accused is the same re-
gardless of the identity of the party making the comment; (3) non-
experts may state their opinions in cases where those opinions are
based on a number of indescribable facts; and (4) an out-of-court
statement may be admitted into testimony as probative of guilt.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Gahil Oliviera (Oliveira), Robert McKinney (McKinney), Jason
Ferrell (Ferrell), and Pedro Sanders (Sanders) were charged with
two conspiracies, the murder of John Carpenter, and assault and
attempted murder of Lorenzo Evans (Evans).1 Four of the issues
raised on appeal were particularly noteworthy.
Ferrell stated during discovery that Debra Baptista (Baptista)
would testify that she saw and spoke to him between 10:45 a.m.
and 11:15 a.m. on the day of the shooting.2 During the trial, she
also attempted to testify that Ferrell had returned to her house
shortly after 11:15 a.m. and stayed until 11:35 a.m. 3 The trial jus-
tice ruled the additional testimony a Rule 164 violation as the de-
fendant had not given the required notice of the alibi testimony.5
Evans was charged with a separate murder and held in the
Intake Center at the Adult Correctional Facility (ACI).6 A witness
that was planning to testify against Evans was also housed at the
ACI at that time.7 While at the ACI, the witness allegedly told
Evans that if Evans did not testify in the Carpenter murder trial,
the witness would not testify against Evans in his murder trial.8
The defense objected on hearsay grounds to the testimony of this
conversation being admitted into the trial at issue.9
1. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 901-02 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id. at 907.
3. Id. at 908.
4. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P.
5. Oliveira, 774 A.2d at 908.
6. Id. at 917.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Campbell's attorney stated during the trial that none of the
defendants had testified as to whether they personally knew Car-
penter. 10 The trial justice instructed the jury to disregard the
statement." Campbell's attorney continued, stating that "[there
was] no testimony that my client knew John Carpenter. No one
has testified how they knew Lorenzo Evans."12 Oliveira's counsel
requested a cautionary instruction and counsel for Ferrell and
Sanders requested a motion to pass.13 The trial justice denied the
motion to pass, stating that it was not made at the appropriate
time.14 The trial justice reminded the jurors that no defendant
may be compelled by the state to testify and that guilt or innocence
may not be inferred, as it is the right of the defendant alone to
choose to testify.15
Finally, the prosecution asked a defense lay witness to identify
shoe prints made in the snow when Evans ran away from his at-
tackers.16 At issue was whether Evans ran to a chain link fence
(as he originally stated), or a wooden picket fence (as he later testi-
fied).17 The significant difference was that he would only have
been able to see his pursuers from the top of the picket fence.' 8
The trial justice permitted the state, over the defendants' objec-
tion, to ask a defense lay witness to identify the type of shoe that
had made footprints in the snow leading to the chain link fence. 19
The defendants were convicted of two conspiracies. 2° Three of
the defendants were also convicted of murder and assault. 21 One
defendant was convicted of assault and acquitted of murder.22 The
defendants appealed. 23
10. Id. at 911.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 915.
17. Id. at 916.
18. Id. at 901 n.3.
19. Id. at 915.
20. Id. at 903.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The defendant Ferrell argued that the trial justice erred in
precluding him from offering alibi testimony from Baptista for
events after 11:15 a.m.24 Rule 16(c) requires that the defendant
must give written notification to the State detailing with specific-
ity the place that the defendant claims to have been.25 Baptista
attempted to testify that she had seen Ferrell after 11:15 a.m. on
the day of the shooting, though she had not provided that informa-
tion to the State. The supreme court held that exclusion was not
an excessive sanction for evidence that is entirely a surprise, when
the defendant had not given any explanation for non-disclosure of
additional alibi testimony. 26
Next, the defendants argued on appeal that the trial justice
erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after Campbell's attorney
stated in closing argument that there was no testimony that any of
the defendants knew Carpenter. 27 The Fifth Amendment prohib-
its adverse comments by the prosecution or the trial justice on the
decision of an accused not to testify. 28 The supreme court held that
counsel for a co-defendant is prohibited from commenting on the
failure of the accused to testify, noting that the prejudice to the
accused is the same regardless of the fact that defense counsel
made the comment.29 To rectify the error, an adequate cautionary
instruction must be immediately delivered to the jury in an easily
understandable manner that clearly informs the jury that the de-
fendant has a constitutional right to choose not to testify in his
own defense. 30
The supreme court held that the three separate instructions
given were adequate to ameliorate any possible damage that
occurred.3 1
The defendants also argued on appeal that the trial justice
erred when she permitted the state, over the defendants' objection,
24. Id. at 907.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 911.
28. Id. (citing State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 835 (R.I. 1980) (citing Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965))).
29. Id. at 911-12 (citing Gibbons, 418 A.2d at 835-36 (citing United States v.
Kaplan, 576 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1078 (1979))).
30. Id. at 912 (citing State v. Sherman, 317 A.2d 445, 448 (1974)).
31. Id.
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to ask a defense lay witness to identify the type of shoe that had
made footprints in the snow. 32 Rule 701 of the Rhode Island Rules
of Evidence governs lay witness testimony.33 Opinion testimony
may be used when the subject matter of the testimony cannot be
reproduced or described to the jury precisely as it appeared to the
witness at the time.34 The court noted that non-experts may state
their opinions in cases where those opinions are based on a num-
ber of indescribable facts.35 In the issue at hand, it would be ex-
tremely difficult to detail conclusively the entire pattern of
observed details in the shoe print in the snow.36 Describing the
prints as "probably made by sneakers" allows a summation of all
the observed details into one comprehensible observation, and
might be properly denoted as a statement of "composite fact."37
Finally, the defendants argued on appeal that the trial justice
erred by allowing Evans to testify about the out-of-court statement
made to Evans in the ACI.38 The supreme court held that the
statement at issue could not be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.39 Instead, the court held that the statement was not
hearsay since it was not offered to prove that if Evans did not tes-
tify in the Carpenter case, the other inmate would not testify
against Evans in his trial for murder.40 The supreme court found
that the statement could be admitted because it was offered as pro-
bative of the defendants' guilt: the statement was made to Evans
because the defendants knew that his testimony would be damag-
ing to their case.41
32. Id. at 915.
33. R.I. R. Evid. 701. The rule provides that:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions is limited to those opinions which are (A) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (B) helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
34. Id. (citing State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1111 (R.I. 1999) (citing
State v. Bowden, 473 A.2d 275, 280 (R.I. 1984))).
35. Id. (citing State v. Hairston, 396 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1977)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 916-17.
39. Id. at 917-18.
40. Id. at 918.
41. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held: (1) exclusion of alibi
testimony is not an excessive sanction for testimony that is en-
tirely a surprise; (2) the Fifth Amendment prohibits adverse com-
ments by the prosecution or the trial justice on the decision of an
accused not to testify; the supreme court also prohibits counsel for
a co-defendant from commenting on the failure of the accused to
testify since the prejudice to the accused is the same; (3) in deter-
mining whether lay witness testimony is admissible, non-experts
may state their opinions in cases where those opinions are based
on a number of indescribable facts; and (4) an out-of-court state-
ment may be admitted if non-hearsay and probative of guilt.
Susan Knorr Rodriguez
